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The Global Food Crisis: Law, Policy, and the
Elusive Quest for Justice
Carmen G. Gonzalezt
The right to food is recognized as a fundamental human right in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child.' Notwithstanding the obligation of states to
respect, protect, and fulfill this right, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reports that 1.02 billion people
are chronically undernourished worldwide-a figure that represents one-
sixth of humanity. 2 While fifteen million of the world's food insecure
people are located in the Global North, the remaining billion reside in Asia,
Africa, Latin America, the Pacific, and the Caribbean.
The food crisis of 2008 propelled the issue of food security from the
margins to the center of public debate, and focused the world's attention
on the need for sustainable and equitable food production and distribution
systems. From 2006 through 2008, skyrocketing food prices plunged an
additional 115 million people into the ranks of the malnourished and
provoked food riots across the globe.4 The immediate causes of the food
t Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
1. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NRO/752/35/img/NRO75235.pdf?OpenElement; United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 24 & 27, G.A. Res. 44/25, at 167, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989), International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., 1496th plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
2. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (FAO), THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE
WORLD 2009, 11 (2009).
3. See id. at 11. Food insecurity has also been growing in the United States. According to
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 14.6 percent of American households experienced periods
of food insecurity in 2008- a significant increase from 11.1 percent in 2007. See MARK NORD ET
AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, ECONOMIC
RESEARCH REPORT No. 83, at iii (2009), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov.
4. See FAO, THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 2009, 6, 9, available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i854e/i854e00.htm [hereinafter, FAO, STATE OF
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crisis included adverse weather, high oil prices, rising worldwide meat
consumption, growing demand for grain-based biofuels, and financial
speculation in global commodity markets.5 Curiously, high food prices
coincided with bumper cereal harvests in major food-producing nations
and with hefty profits by the transnational corporations that dominate
global food and agro-chemical markets. 6 The FAO's 2009 report on global
commodity markets pointed out that the food crisis was provoked
primarily by escalating demand (notably demand for grain-based biofuels)
rather than shrinking supply.7 Indeed, the world's food supply has kept
pace with population growth for several decades.8 There is currently
sufficient food to meet global nutritional needs, but many households are
simply too poor to purchase the food that is available. 9
Despite the global trend toward urbanization, poverty and
undernourishment remain concentrated in the rural areas of the Global
South. Approximately seventy-five percent of the developing world's poor
reside in rural communities.1 0 The majority are small farmers who produce
at least 70 percent of the world's food and whose livelihoods depend on
marketing their agricultural products." These farmers suffered when
domestic crop prices plummeted as a consequence of food aid and of the
influx of highly subsidized food imports from industrialized countries. 12
but they did not benefit from the recent food price increases because prices
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 2009].
5. See id. at 15; U.N. Conference On Trade and Development [UNCTAD], The 2008 Food
Price Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies, G-24 Discussion Paper No. 29, at 3-8, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/GDS/MDP/G24/2009/3 (June 2009) (prepared by Anuradha Mittal).
6. See Eric Holt-Gim6nez, The World Food Crisis: What's Behind It and What We Can Do About
It, Food First Policy Brief No. 16, at 6 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.foodfirst.org/files/pdf/PB#16#World#Food#Crisis.pdf; Geoffrey Lean, Rising
Prices Threaten Millions with Starvation, Despite Bumper Crops, THE INDEP., March 2, 2008.
7. See FAO, STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 2009, supra note 4, at 16.
8. Holt-Gimenez, supra note 6, at 2-3FRANCES MOORE LAPPE ET AL., WORLD HUNGER:
TWELVE MYTHS 9 (1998).
9. See Holt-Gimenez, supra note 6, at 2-3; Lean, supra note 6.
10. See Thomas Hirsch et al., Deepening the Food Crisis? Climate Change, Food Security and
the Right to Food, in THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE: TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO
TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES 78, 84 (2009), available at
http://www.fian.org/resources/documents/others/the-global-food-challenge/pdf; FAO,
THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2003, 16 (2003), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/j0083e/j0083e00.htm [hereinafter FAO, STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY 2003].
11. See Action Group on Erosion, Technology, and Concentration, WHO WILL FEED Us? 1
(Nov. 2009), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/
pdffile/ETCWhoWillFeedUs.pdf; Kevin Watkins & Joachim von Braun, Time to Stop
Dumping on the World's Poor, in INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2002-2003
ANNUAL REPORT, 2, available at http://www.ifpri.org/publication/time-stop-dumping-
worlds-poor.
12. See, e.g., JAMES WESSEL, TRADING THE FUTURE: FARM EXPORTS AND THE
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER IN OUR FOOD SYSTEM 168 (1983) (pointing out that
provision of cheap food to developing countries, whether in the form of food aid or
commercial food imports, contributed to rural poverty in the Global South by driving down
prices farmers received for crops); Harvesting Poverty: The Unkept Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2003, at A20 (explaining how protectionist trade policies in the industrialized world,
specifically, high levels of agricultural subsidies, encourage overproduction, depress
commodity prices, and impoverish farmers in the developing world).
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for inputs (such as seeds and fertilizer) skyrocketed as well and because
most small farmers do not have direct access to markets and are thus
dependent on intermediaries. 13 In light of the importance of rural
communities to global food security, the Advisory Committee to the U.N.
Human Rights Council has prepared a report that emphasizes the need to
protect the rights of small farmers in the context of the right to food.14
Even though food insecurity is a function of poverty rather than food
scarcity, the Group of 8 (G-8) industrialized nations, the World Bank, and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) responded to the food crisis with
supply-oriented solutions (such as food aid and proposals to boost food
production) and with the familiar calls for market-oriented reforms rather
than proactive state intervention.k Sadly, these responses fail to address
the deeper structural causes of food insecurity in the Global South,
including inequities in the rules governing international trade, ill-advised
economic reforms imposed by international financial institutions, and the
dominance of transnational corporations in global food markets. Indeed,
even before the 2008 food crisis, undernourishment had been on the rise for
at least a decade, undermining progress toward the Millennium
Development Goal of reducing world hunger in half by 2015 relative to
1990-1992 levels. 16
While food prices have stabilized, they remain high by historic
standards and are not predicted to decline in the near future.17 Unless the
underlying structural causes of chronic food insecurity are acknowledged
and addressed, it appears increasingly unlikely that the Millennium
Development Goal of halving world hunger by 2015 will be achieved.
This essay examines the historic and current practices that have
contributed to food insecurity in developing countries, and recommends
several steps that the international community might take to promote the
fundamental human right to food. Part I places the current food crisis in
historical perspective by discussing the trade and aid policies that laid the
foundation for food insecurity in the Global South from colonialism until
the early 1980s. Part II explains how food insecurity was exacerbated by the
free market reforms implemented in the Global South in the last three
decades pursuant to the structural adjustment programs mandated by
international financial institutions and pursuant to multilateral and
bilateral trade agreements. Part III discusses the impact of the financial
crisis and the climate crisis on food security. Parts IV and V conclude by
suggesting steps that the international community might take to promote
food security through international law and regulation.
13. See FAO, STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 2009, supra note 4, at 34-35.
14. See U.N. Human Rights Council Advisory Comm., Peasant Farmers and the Rigit to
Food: a History of Discrimination and Exploitation, A/HRC/AC/3/CRP.5 (Aug. 4, 2009) (prepared
by Jean Ziegler), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/
advisorycommittee/ A.HRC.AC.3.CRP.5.pdf.
15. See U.N. Conference on Food and Development, supra note 5, at 16-18.
16. See FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2009, supra note 2, at 8.
17. See FAO, STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 2009, supra note 4, at 6.
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I. THE HISTORIC ROOTS OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
The root cause of food insecurity in the Global South is the imposition
through trade, aid, and financial institutions of an agricultural
development model that undermines rural livelihoods, increases ecological
vulnerability, and places developing countries in a structurally
disadvantageous position in world trade.
As a consequence of the plantation-based production and trade
patterns imposed under colonialism, most developing countries entered
the world economy as producers of natural resources and consumers of
imported manufactured goods. 8 Specialization in agricultural exports is
economically disadvantageous due to the volatility of world market
agricultural prices and to the declining terms of trade for primary
commodities vis-A-vis manufactured goods.'9 In other words, countries
that export agricultural products cannot count on steady revenue streams
for investment, and must sell increasing amounts of their output in world
markets in order to purchase the same amount of manufactured products.20
Agro-export specialization also diverts prime agricultural land from food
production to cash crop production, concentrates land ownership in the
hands of the rural elite, and consigns many small farmers to poverty by
relegating them to fragile, ecologically marginal lands.21
The structural disadvantage of agro-export specialization is relevant to
food security because the most food-insecure countries are those that do
not produce sufficient food to satisfy domestic needs and depend on the
export of a small number of agricultural commodities for a substantial
portion of their foreign exchange earnings.22 Adverse weather, pest
infestations, and market price fluctuations can depress export earnings and
deprive these countries of the resources necessary to finance food imports
and productive investment.23 For example, many agro-exporting
developing countries were harmed by the 2008 food price increases
because they are net food importers and the price of imported food staples,
such as cereals and oilseeds, rose far more dramatically than the price of
the products that these countries export (e.g. as coffee, cocoa, cotton, and
rubber).24 Consequently, economic diversification and industrialization
18. See CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE Loss OF
GENETIC DIVERSITY 40-41 (1996); E.M. YOUNG, WORLD HUNGER 41-42 (1997).
19. See JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 86
(1997); PETER ROBBINS, STOLEN FRUIT: THE TROPICAL COMMODITIES DISASTER 2-3, 7-15 (2003).
20. See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 19, at 172.
21. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 18, at 95-96; WESSEL, supra note 12, at 166-67;
YOUNG, supra note 18, at 66.
22. See CHRISTOPHER STEVENS ET AL., THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
SECURITY 14 (2000); FAO, THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 2004, 19 (2004),
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5419e/y5419e00.htm [hereinafter FAO, STATE
OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 2004].
23. See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 19, at 86; FAO, STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY
MARKETS 2004, supra note 22, at 12-13; ROBBINS, STOLEN FRUIT: THE TROPICAL COMMODITIES
DISASTER, supra note 19, at 2-3, 7-15 ; YOUNG, supra note 18, at 41-42.
24. See FAO, STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 2009, supra note 4, at 10, 27-
29.
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promote food security at the national level by guaranteeing a reliable
revenue stream with which to purchase food.25
Regrettably, the trade and aid policies of wealthy countries in the
aftermath of World War II exacerbated rural poverty in the Global South
and deprived many developing countries of the resources needed for
economic diversification. In the post-war period, the United States and
Western Europe provided generous subsidies to their agricultural
producers and utilized both tariff and non-tariff import barriers to protect
them from foreign competition.26 By contrast, most developing countries
imposed taxes on agricultural producers to finance industrialization and
lacked the resources to provide farmers with significant subsidies.27
The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947 GATT) did
little to curb Northern agricultural protectionism. Negotiated at a time
when most developing countries were under colonial rule, the 1947 GATT
favored the interests of the Global North at the expense of the Global
South.28 While industrialized countries benefited from the 1947 GATT's
reduction of tariffs on manufactured goods, various GATT exemptions
enabled industrialized countries to heavily subsidize the agricultural sector
and to limit or exclude textiles, clothing, and agricultural products from
their less developed counterparts. 29 In response to sustained pressure from
developing countries, the 1947 GATT was amended several times in order
to foster greater access by the Global South to Northern markets and to
enable developing countries to promote industrialization through the
protection of infant industries.30 However, the amendments were often
couched in non-binding language, proved unwieldy and unworkable, and
frequently excluded the very products of greatest interest to developing
countries.31 In short, the 1947 GATT succeeded in reducing tariffs on
manufactured goods, but permitted agricultural protectionism to flourish
in the United States and Western Europe.
One of the consequences of agricultural protectionism was a glut of
food on U.S. markets, which prompted the United States to dispose of its
surplus production in developing countries as food aid pursuant to U.S.
25. See JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION 76-77, 168-70 (1989);
Eric S. Reinert, Increasing Poverty in a Globalized World: Marshall Plans and Morgenthau Plans as
Mechanisnis of Polarization of World Incomes, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 453, 470
(Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003).
26. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 141, 155-56
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter GATT URUGUAY ROUND]; M. Ataman Aksoy, Global
Agricultural Trade Policies, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37
(M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin eds., 2004).
27. See GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 26, at 154-157; Aksoy, supra note 26, at 37.
28. See PHILIPPE CULLET, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 60 (2003); Faizel Ismail, Rediscovering the Role of Developing Countries in GATT Before the
Doha Round, 1 L. & DEV. REV. 49, 50, 55 (2008).
29. See YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 107-10
(2006); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 440-46 (2002); Ismail, supra
note 28, at 58-59.
30. See Ismail, supra note 28, at 65-67.
31. See LEE, supra note 29, at 37-38.
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Public Law 480 (the so-called "Food for Peace Program"). 32 This practice
exacerbated food insecurity in the Global South by depressing agricultural
commodity prices and undermining the livelihoods of poor farmers; at the
same time, the import barriers maintained by the United States and other
wealthy nations deprived developing countries of the foreign exchange
earnings necessary to finance imports and to promote industrialization.33
The next major milestone in the transformation of Southern agriculture
was the Green Revolution. Funded by the Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations, the Green Revolution sought to reduce world hunger by
increasing global crop yields.34 International crop breeding institutions
developed new varieties of rice, wheat, and corn that produced higher
yields than traditional varieties in response to the application of synthetic
fertilizers and controlled irrigation.3
While the Green Revolution was a tremendous success from the
standpoint of food production, it ultimately exacerbated food insecurity by
increasing poverty and inequality in the Global South. 36 First, the Green
Revolution disproportionately benefited wealthy farmers because many
poor farmers could not afford the synthetic fertilizers, chemical pesticides,
and irrigation equipment necessary to achieve high yields.37 Second, by
increasing world food production, the Green Revolution depressed
agricultural commodity prices and rendered many small farmers
destitute.38
The Green Revolution also produced serious environmental
degradation in the Global South as farmers abandoned ecologically
sustainable low-input agricultural practices in favor of uniform seeds,
chemical fertilizers, and synthetic pesticides manufactured by
transnational corporations based in the industrialized world.39 The
environmental consequences of this dramatic shift to industrial agriculture
included loss of soil fertility, depletion of aquifers, agrochemical
contamination of surface waters and groundwater, loss of ecosystem
32. See Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-
1736e (1982); Food for Peace Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-808, § 3(c), 80 Stat. 1526 (codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1427, 1431, 1431b, 1691-1736e (1982)); WESSEL, supra note 12, at 29-31, 52-55,
168-76.
33. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition: Agricultural Trade
Policy Through an Environmental Justice Lens, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 345, 361 (2006).
34. See GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR ALL IN THE 21T
CENTURY 44-51 (1997); KEITH GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
144 (2d ed. 1990).
35. See CONWAY, supra note 34, at 47-52, 60-61.
36. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 18, at 58-59; KEITH GRIFFIN, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE: AN ESSAY ON THE GREEN REVOLUTION 51-52 (1974); YOUNG,
supra note 18, at 72. Over eighty percent of the published reports on the Green Revolution
conclude that it had a negative impact on poverty and inequality. See Donald K. Freebairn,
Did the Green Revolution Concentrate Tncomes? A Quantitative Study of Research Reports, 23
WORLD DEV. 265, 277 (1995).
37. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The
Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 419,
442-43 (2004).
38. See GRIFFIN, supra note 34, at 158; Gonzalez, supra note 37, at 443-44.
39. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 18, at 75-76, 130-31; LORI ANN THRUPP, LINKING
BIODIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURE: CHALLENGES FOR SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY 35 (1997).
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biodiversity, loss of traditional food crops, increased pesticide-related
illness, narrowing of the genetic base of the world's food supply, and
heightened vulnerability of the global food supply to catastrophic blight.40
Ecosystem biodiversity and food crop diversity are essential to food
security for at least two reasons. First, highly diverse ecosystems are more
resilient to environmental perturbations (e.g. droughts, heavy rains, and
outbreaks of new pests that may be associated with climate change), and
provide a wide range of "free" ecosystem services (e.g. pest control,
pollination, and enhanced soil fertility).4' Second, modern plant breeders
depend on wild crops to furnish the fresh germplasm that can be used to
produce crops capable of withstanding a variety of environmental stresses
and of serving as new food sources. 42 Alarmingly, the expansion of
industrial agriculture is exacerbating the vulnerability of the world's food
supply to catastrophic climate change by narrowing the number of food
crops cultivated, reducing the genetic diversity within these cultivated
crops, degrading ecosystem services, and encouraging reliance on non-
renewable petroleum-based agrochemicals whose production and use
release greenhouse gases.43
In short, Northern trade and aid policies laid the groundwork for food
insecurity in the Global South by reinforcing economically
disadvantageous agro-export specialization, exacerbating rural poverty,
and promoting agricultural production systems that deplete biodiversity
and rely on environmentally harmful agrochemicals.
II. DOUBLE STANDARDS IN WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE
The debt crisis of the 1980s inaugurated a series of economic reforms
that increased the structural vulnerability of developing countries to food
insecurity. As a consequence of significant petroleum price increases by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the early 1970s,
many developing countries borrowed money from commercial banks to
finance the importation of fuel and petroleum-based agricultural inputs.44
When additional oil price shocks in 1979-80 coincided with rising interest
rates and plummeting agricultural commodity prices, developing countries
incurred crippling amounts of debt that they were increasingly unable to
40. See CONWAY, supra note 34, at 86-104; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 18, at 63-81;
THRUPP, supra note 39, at 32-33.
41. See THOMAS PRUGH, NATURAL CAPITAL AND HUMAN ECONOMIC SURVIVAL 58-62, 66-69
(1995); UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME [UNEP], THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD
CRISIS: THE ENVIRONMENT'S ROLE IN AVERTING FUTURE FOOD CRISES 66 (Christian Nellemann
et al. eds., 2009); David Tilman, Biodiversity and Ecosysten Functioning, in NATURE'S SERVICES:
SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOYSTEMS 93, 104-06 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
42. See PRUGH, supra note 41, at 64-65; UNEP, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS, supra
note 41, at 74; Norman Myers, Biodiversity's Genetic Library, in NATURE'S SERVICES, supra note
41, at 255, 256-63.
43. See PRUGH, supra note 41, at 81-84.
44. See SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT: THE WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE
POOR 28-29 (1990); RICHARD PEET ET AL., UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO
71 (2003).
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repay.45 By the mid-1980s, two-thirds of African countries and nearly three-
quarters of Latin American countries had agreed to implement structural
adjustment programs mandated by the World Bank and the IMF as
conditions for receiving new loans or restructuring existing debt.46
Structural adjustment exacerbated poverty and inequality, reinforced
the crippling dependence of developing countries on agro-export
specialization, and inflicted serious environmental damage. In order to
maximize the revenues available to service the foreign debt, developing
countries were instructed to expand agricultural commodity exports.47 The
aggressive shift to export production diverted land and other resources
from food crops to cash crops, increased dependence on food imports, and
harmed the environment by accelerating the expansion of chemical-
intensive industrial agriculture.48 Furthermore, this economic strategy
ultimately depressed the export earnings of developing countries by
glutting world markets with competing export commodities from multiple
debtor nations.49
Structural adjustment also introduced a double standard that continues
to plague world agricultural trade: protectionism for the wealthy and free
markets for the poor. As a condition of debt restructuring, developing
countries were required to adopt a standard recipe of free market economic
reforms, including the reduction of tariffs, the elimination of non-tariff
import barriers, and the curtailment of government services and
subsidies.s0 However, developed countries continued to subsidize and
protect their agricultural producers while reaping the benefits of relative
market openness in developing countries.51 The elimination of tariff and
non-tariff import barriers in developing countries exposed Southern
farmers to direct competition from highly subsidized Northern agricultural
producers.52 The vulnerability of developing country farmers was
compounded by the elimination of agricultural input and food subsidies,
the curtailment of subsidized credit, the reduction of extension services,
45. See GEORGE, supra note 44, at 27-28, 45 (attributing debt burden of non-oil producing
developing countries to oil price shocks of 1973-74 and particularly 1979-80); PEET ET AL., Supra
note 44, at 74 (stating that sharp drop in global commodity prices in early 1980s required
many export-dependent non-oil producing developing countries to increase foreign
borrowing); YOUNG, supra note 18, at 42-43 (explaining that 1973 and 1979 oil price shocks
accelerated developing country borrowing at increasingly high interest rates during a period
of declining prices for developing country exports).
46. PEET ET AL., supra note 44, at 75.
47. See GEORGE, supra note 44, at 59-60; JOHN MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL: THE NEED FOR A
NEW AGRICULTURE 24 (2002).
48. U.N. Conference on Food and Development, supra note 5, at 13-15; STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT PARTICIPATORY REV. INT'L NETWORK (SAPRIN), THE POLICY ROOTS OF ECONOMIC
CRISIS AND POVERTY: A MULTI-COUNTRY PARTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT 124-26 (2002), available at http:www.saprin.org/SAPRIFindings.pdf [hereinafter
SAPRIN].
49. See BELINDA COOTE, THE TRADE TRAP 34-35 (1992); GEORGE, supra note 44, at 60-61;
MADELEY, supra note 47, at 154-55; ROBBINS, supra notel9, at 29-30.
50. See MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY 62-63 (1997); GEORGE,
supra note 44, at 52.
51. See Gonzalez, supra note 33, at 365.
52. See MICHAEL E. CONROY ET AL., A CAUTIONARY TALE: FAILED U.S. DEVELOPMENT
POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 14 (1996); MADELEY, supra note 47, at 120.
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and the withdrawal of the public sector from agricultural marketing.53
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture
purported to mitigate these inequities in international agricultural trade
and to "establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system"
by gradually dismantling agricultural subsidies and tariffs.54 Regrettably,
the agreement reinforced the international double standard. While
ambiguities in the agreement's key provisions enabled developed countries
to maintain high levels of agricultural protectionism, the agreement did
succeed in prohibiting developing countries from raising tariffs to regulate
the flow of agricultural imports into their markets so as to protect small
farmers from economically ruinous surges of cheap imported food
products.5
As a consequence of this double standard in the rules governing
international agricultural trade, agricultural producers in the United States
and the European Union destroyed the livelihoods of millions of small
farmers in the developing world by dumping agricultural commodities on
world markets at prices below the cost of production.56 The devastating
surges of cheap imported food further impoverished the world's most food
insecure population, and exacerbated food insecurity at the national level
by discouraging food production in developing nations.57 As domestic
food production declined, developing countries became increasingly
dependent on food imports. In the course of a few decades, net food-
exporting developing countries were transformed into net food importers
as a consequence of liberalization commitments undertaken pursuant to
structural adjustment programs, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and
bilateral and regional free trade agreements.s8 These former food-exporting
countries are now being buffeted by the soaring cost of imported food.
Finally, it is important to recognize that world market prices for
agricultural inputs and agricultural commodities are distorted by the
market power of transnational corporations.59 For example, three
53. See U.N. Conference on Food and Development, supra note 5, at 8-11; SAPRIN, supra
note 48, at 116-18.
54. Agreement on Agriculture pmbl. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/14-ag.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on
Agriculture]; see also Gonzalez, supra note 29, at 452-58 (analyzing the main provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture).
55. See Gonzalez, supra note 29, at 459-68, 478-80.
56. See SOPHIA MURPHY ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURAL TRADE & POLICY, WTO
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: A DECADE OF DUMPING 1 (2005), available at
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/ibrary.cfm?ReflD=48532.
57. See ACTIONAID, THE IMPACT OF AGRO-EXPORT SURGES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 8
(2008), available at http://www.actionaid.org/docs/
cheap%20imports%20and%20protection%20of%20ag.pdf.
58. See id. at 8-10.
59. See RAJ PATEL & SANAZ MEMARSADEGHI, AGRICULTURAL RESTRUCTURING AND
CONCENTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES?, FOOD FIRST POLICY BRIEF
No. 6, 34-36 (2003), available at http://www.foodfirst.org/pubs/policy/pb6.pdf; PETER M.
ROSSET, FOOD IS DIFFERENT: WHY WE MUST GET THE WTO OUT OF AGRICULTURE 45-49 (2006)
(describing the concentration of U.S. agriculture); Timothy A. Wise, The Paradox of Agricultural
Subsidies: Measurement Issues, Agricultural Dumping, and Policy Reform 8-9, 24 (Global Dev. &
Env't Inst. Working Paper No. 04-02, 2004), available at
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/04-02AgSubsidies.pdf.
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companies control eighty two percent of all U.S. corn exports. 60 The top
three agrochemical corporations control approximately half of the global
agrochemical market, and the top ten control nearly ninety percent of that
market.61 Although thousands of seed companies and breeding institutions
were in existence decades ago, ten firms currently dominate over two
thirds of the world's proprietary seed sales. 62 This market concentration
enables a small number of agribusiness conglomerates to manipulate
market prices to their advantage at the expense of small farmers and
consumers in the Global North as well as the Global South.63 In addition,
these agribusiness conglomerates dominate the agricultural research
agenda, and have used their considerable political influence to persuade
U.S. government officials to support biofuels as the solution to climate
change, to promote genetic engineering as the solution to the food crisis,
and to demand greater access to developing country markets in bilateral
and multilateral trade negotiations while maintaining lavish agricultural
subsidies in the domestic market.64
In sum, the global food crisis is not a problem of food supply but the
consequence of ill-advised policies imposed on the Global South by
international aid, trade, and financial institutions. These policies have
benefited the transnational food industry at the expense of the world's
most vulnerable populations, who are also the stewards of the biodiverse
food systems necessary to respond to the looming climate crisis. As a
consequence of these misguided policies, billions of small farmers in the
Global South have been driven off their land and into urban slums at a rate
that vastly exceeds the availability of urban employment.65
III. COMMODITY SPECULATION, BIOFUELS, AND LAND GRABS
The climate crisis and the financial crisis have only exacerbated the
threats to food security outlined above. The bursting of the U.S. housing
bubble shifted speculative investment into agricultural commodities and
contributed significantly to the 2008 spike in food prices.66 This dramatic
60. See ROSSET, supra note 59, at 46.
61. See ETC GROUP, WHO OWNS NATURE? 4, 15 (2008), available at
http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/707/01/etc won report final color.pdf.
62. Id. at 3-5, 12.
63. See generally, SOPHIA MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND: MARKETS, FARMERS
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 21-29, 32 (2002), available at
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/1ibrary.cfm?ReflD=25497; PATEL & MEMARSADEGHI, supra
note 59, at 34-36; ROSSET, supra note 59, at 46-48; BILL VORLEY, FOOD, INC.: CORPORATE
CONCENTRATION FROM FARM TO CONSUMER (2003), available at
http://www.ukfg.org.uk/docs/UKFG-Foodinc-Nov03.pdf; Wise, supra note 59, at 8. In the
United States, for example, farmers have been plagued by skyrocketing seed prices as a
consequence of the advent of genetically modified crops and market concentration in the seed
industry. These unprecedented price increases have prompted a Justice Department antitrust
investigation of the seed industry and greater government scrutiny of competition (or lack
thereof) in agricultural markets. See William Neuman, Rapid Rise in Seed Prices Draws U.S.
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010, at Bi).
64. See ROSSET, supra note 59, at 41-51.
65. See e.g., ROBIN HAHNEL, THE ABCS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 189-90 (2002).
66. See Peter Wahl, The Role of Speculation in the 2008 Food Price Bubble, in THE GLOBAL
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increase in food prices threatened the well-being of hundreds of millions of
poor people and sparked worldwide social unrest.67 While food prices
declined once the bubble burst, the failure of states to regulate speculation
in agricultural commodity markets poses ongoing risks to food security by
increasing market volatility and by permitting the periodic formation of
speculative bubbles.68
Food security is also threatened by biofuel production. The decision by
the United States and the European Union to subsidize biofuel production
in order to achieve energy security and to mitigate climate change has
driven up food prices and reduced production of other food crops. 69
Ironically, the production of certain biofuels may result in greater
greenhouse gas emissions than conventional fossil fuels. For example, the
emissions resulting from corn ethanol production in the United States
(including the emissions that result from cultivating corn and processing it
into corn starch) may actually exceed fossil fuel emissions by more than ten
percent. 70 When corn cultivation shifts to developing countries, the
emissions are even greater as rainforests and peatlands are converted into
agricultural lands.71 Corn production also has serious impacts on the local
environment, including chemical contamination of water supplies,
depletion of aquifers, and degradation of wildlife habitat.72 In short,
ethanol production appears to benefit the large corporations that receive
government subsidies at the expense of the food security and
environmental quality in the Global North and the Global South.
In addition, the biofuels boom and the increase in food prices have
spawned an extraordinary number of negotiations between private
investors and Southern governments for the sale or long-term lease of
agricultural lands.73 These so-called "land grabs" have been prompted by
the desire of investing countries to guarantee food supplies at a time of
market volatility, to offset domestic shortages of arable land and irrigation
water, and to tap into the growing demand for biofuels through offshore
production.74 While the financial crisis has slowed the pace of these
FOOD CHALLENGE, supra note 10, at 68, 70.
67. See id. at 68, 70-71.
68. See id. at 75-76.
69. See FAO, STATE OF AGRICULTURE COMMODITY MARKETS 2009, supra note 4, at 19-21;
U.N. Conference on Food and Development, supra note 5, at 6-8.
70. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard
Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,904, 25,043, tbl.VI.C.1-2, tbl. VI.C.1-3 (proposed May 26, 2009) (to be
codified ar 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
71. See U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION AND USE OF
RESOURCES: ASSESSING BIOFUELS 67-68 (2009), available at http://www.unep.fr/scp/rpanel/
pdf/AssessingBiofuels Full Report.pdf.
72. See William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environniental Degradation and
Poor Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 251-72 (2009).
73. See Alexandra Spieldoch & Sophia Murphy, Agricultural Land Acquisitions: Implications
for Food Security and Poverty Alleviation, in LAND GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORLD'S FARMLAND
39, 39 (Michael Kugelman & Susan L. Levenstein eds., 2009), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ASIA_090629_Land%20Grab-rpt.pdf
[hereinafter LAND GRAB?].
74. See Michael Kugelman, Introduction, in LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at 2; Spieldoch &
Murphy, supra note 73, at 41-42.
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transactions, they nevertheless pose a number of risks, including
interference with food production, degradation or depletion of natural
resources, and dispossession of small farmers.7 For example, small farmers
who do not have formal title to the lands they traditionally cultivate may
be expelled by foreign investors or by local elites eager to sell or lease these
lands to foreign investors. 76 Indeed, even farmers possessing formal title
may be persuaded or coerced to sell vast tracts of productive land for
export-oriented agricultural production despite chronic domestic food
insecurity.77 The substitution of labor-intensive subsistence production
with export-driven chemical-intensive industrial agriculture may depress
domestic food availability, increase poverty by reducing rural
employment, accelerate agrochemical contamination of water supplies,
diminish agrobiodiversity, deplete the land through intensive cultivation,
and divert or exhaust water resources needed by local communities.78
Finally, climate change itself poses risks to global food security.
Notwithstanding their negligible contribution to climate change, the
world's poorest countries will be disproportionately affected due to their
dependence on agricultural production, their vulnerable geographic
locations, and their limited resources for adaptation and for response to
natural disasters. 79 Small farmers will experience the most acute
hardships -particularly those who cultivate marginal or degraded lands.80
Climate change-induced temperature increases and severe weather events
(such as droughts and hurricanes) will likely reduce agricultural yields,
place additional pressure on already strained water resources, and degrade
valuable ecosystem services.81
IV. THE WAY FORWARD: FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OR ADDITIONAL
REGULATION?
Phasing out agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries is an
essential first step toward eliminating the double standards in international
agricultural trade that contribute to food insecurity in the Global South, but
it is not sufficient to address the problem. What is required is a
fundamental reorientation of policy at the national and international levels
75. See Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 73, at 43-48.
76. See Raul Q. Montemayor, Overseas Farmland Tnvestments -Boon or Bane for Farmers in
Asia?, in LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at 101-02.
77. See id. at 101-03.
78. See Ruth Meinzen & Helena Markelova, Nuance: Toward a Code of Conduct in Foreign
Land Deals, in LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at 74; Montemayor, supra note 76, at 102-05;
Spieldock & Murphy, supra note 73, at 46-47.
79. See RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH
DIMENSION 35-41 (2004).
80. See OXFAM, PEOPLE-CENTERED RESILIENCE: WORKING WITH VULNERABLE FARMERS
TOWARDS CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND FOOD SECURITY 33 (Nov. 2009), available at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/ policy/climate change/ downloads/bpl35_people-ce
ntred resilience en_171109.pdf; Hirsch, Lottje & Windfuhr et. al., supra note 10, at 80-82.
81. See Anthony Nyong, Climate Change Tmpacts in the Developing World: fmplications for
Sustainable Development, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL POVERTY 43, 47-51 (Lael Brainard et
al. eds., 2009).
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away from deregulation toward targeted and thoughtful regulatory
strategies designed to respect, protect, and fulfill the human right to food.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
recognizes the "fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger" and
requires state parties to:
take, individually and through international co-operation, the
measures, including programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and
distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific
knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of
nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such
a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization
of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and
food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of
world food supplies in relation to need.82
Countries that are not parties to this treaty are nevertheless obligated
to protect the human right to food pursuant to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which is widely regarded as part of customary
international law or as a codification of general principles of law reflected
in the national constitutions of a large number of countries in various
regions and legal systems of the world.83 What follows is an illustrative but
by no means exhaustive list of the measures that governments might take
at the domestic and the international level to promote food security in the
developing world.
First, governments must reinvest in the agricultural sector and redirect
resources toward small farmers and toward the protection of the natural
resource base necessary for food production. In recent decades, the
diminished role of Southern governments in agricultural production has
left poor farmers without social safety nets and has deprived the
agricultural sector of badly needed infrastructure, technology, education,
credit, insurance, input subsidies, price supports, and marketing
assistance. 84 International financial institutions must support renewed
investment in Southern agriculture and the targeting of resources toward
small farmers and toward sustainable food production. This
recommendation is consistent with the findings of an independent, multi-
82. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art.
11(2).
83. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 25; BERTA ESPERANZA
HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW COVENANT LINKING TRADE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 56-57 (2009); Olivier De Schutter, A Hurnan Rights Approach to Trade and
Investment Policies, in THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE, supra note 10, at 15.
84. Ha-Joon Chang, Rethinking Public Policy in Agriculture: Lessons from History, Distant and
Recent, 36 J. PEASANT STUD. 477, 478, 480-81 (2009); See U.N. Conference on Food and
Development, supra note 5, at 9-11.
474 [Vol. 13
HeinOnline  -- 13 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 474 2010
The Global Food Crisis
stakeholder agricultural assessment initiated by the World Bank and the
FAO and approved by fifty-eight governments in Johannesburg, South
Africa, in April 2008.8) This assessment recognizes the important role of
small-scale diversified farming as a means of addressing poverty, food
security, and conservation of agrobiodiversity, and calls for a systemic
redirection of investment toward the needs of small farmers and toward
the protection of natural resources. 86
Second, multilateral and bilateral trade agreements must give
developing countries the policy flexibility to utilize an appropriate mix of
tariffs and subsidies to encourage domestic food production, protect the
livelihoods of small farmers, and promote rural development. As an initial
matter, developing countries should make aggressive use of the existing
exceptions in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture that exempt certain
forms of support to low-income farmers from subsidy reduction
commitments.87 In addition, trade agreements must give developing
countries greater latitude to use tariffs and import barriers for food security
purposes as well as the right to exclude from trade agreements those
agricultural commodities of greatest importance to domestic nutritional
needs and rural livelihoods (e.g. corn in Mexico). Indeed, these were
among the demands put forth by a coalition of developing countries and
by non-governmental organizations during the Doha Round of WTO
negotiations.88 Policy flexibility is necessary in order to rebuild the
agricultural sector, to protect small farmers from devastating import
surges, and to nurture higher value-added food processing industries.
Third, multilateral and bilateral trade agreements must facilitate the
transition from agro-export specialization to a more diversified economic
base capable of generating steady and reliable revenue streams. As
explained in Part I, the world's most food insecure developing countries
are those that export a narrow range of tropical commodities, and are
thereby subject to chronically sluggish export earnings and market
volatility that make it difficult to afford increasingly expensive imported
food. Economic history teaches us that nearly all industrialized countries
(including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and
Japan) achieved economic prosperity through the use of a broad range of
protectionist measures, such as subsidies, tariffs, and state financing of
major industries.89 Unfortunately, the current WTO framework precludes
developing countries from utilizing many of the development strategies
85. See INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT (IAASTD), GLOBAL REPORT: AGRICULTURE AT A CROSSROADS
(2009) at vii, available at http://www.agassessment.org/reports/IAASTD/
Agriculture%20at%20a%20CrossroadsGlobalo20Report%20(English).pdf.
86. Id. at 379, 411, 497.
87. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 54, art. 7; Gonzalez, supra note 29, at 481-82;
Tobias Reichert, Agricultural Trade Liberalization in Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Negotiations,
in THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE, supra note 10, at 29, 33.
88. See Reichert, supra note 87, at 34-35.
89. See HAJOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 40-60 (2008); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19-51, 59-66 (2002).
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deployed in the past by the Global North to promote those industries most
likely to enhance long-term economic well-being. 90 A key demand of
developing countries in multilateral and regional trade negotiations must
therefore be greater policy space for development.
Fourth, international regulation is necessary to discipline the
oligopolistic power of transnational agribusiness. By ignoring the
distortions caused by market concentration in the agricultural sector while
reducing the ability of the state to intervene on behalf of farmers and
consumers, the free market policies promoted by international trade and
financial institutions reinforce the economic dominance of transnational
agribusiness at the expense of the poor in the developing world.91 Thus, in
addition to phasing out Northern subsidies and import barriers, it is
essential to develop international legal regimes to regulate the anti-
competitive practices of transnational corporations.92
Fifth, governments must resist the siren song of technological, supply-
side fixes-such as genetically modified organisms-to problems
grounded in poverty and inequality. As I have argued elsewhere, profit-
driven, corporate-dominated biotechnology threatens to replicate the anti-
poor bias of the Green Revolution (with expensive patented seeds in
addition to chemical inputs); to reinforce the power of transnational
agribusiness; to displace indigenous food crops and biodiverse cultivation
techniques; to undermine farmers' rights to save, share, and modify seeds;
and to accelerate the loss of cultural knowledge regarding environmentally
friendly methods of food production. 93 In addition, biotechnology
introduces novel environmental risks, namely the transfer of transgenes
from genetically modified crops to their wild relatives with unknown but
potentially serious impacts on biodiversity.94
Sixth, foreign acquisition of Southern agricultural lands must be
carefully regulated to make sure that these transactions benefit affected
communities, uphold the fundamental human right to food, and utilize
natural resources in a sustainable manner. The first step is to strengthen the
domestic law of the host state, including property law, water rights law,
environmental law, tax law, and the laws governing foreign direct
investment, and to ensure that the host state has the capacity to enforce
these laws.95 The second step, as discussed in Part V below, is to develop
international investment agreements that impose substantive human rights
and environmental obligations on the foreign investor and the foreign
90. See LEE, supra note 29, at 9-13.
91. See Gonzalez, supra note 37, at 489-92.
92. See, e.g, Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The
International Environnental Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV 583,
637-39 (2007) (discussing efforts to regulate corporate anti-competitive behavior within the
WTO framework).
93. See id. at 602-11 (examining the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of
genetically modified crops).
94. See id. at 608-09.
95. See CARIN SMALLER & HOWARD MANN, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, A THIRST FOR DISTANT LANDS: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL LAND
AND WATER 9 (2009), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/thirst for distant lands.pdf.
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investor's home state.96
Finally, an analysis of potential regulatory approaches to commodity
speculation and biofuels is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, it
is important to recognize that the promotion of food security requires
decisive measures to prevent the formation of speculative bubbleS97 as well
as thoughtful and deliberate reassessment of biofuels legislation in the
United States and the European Union in order to develop socially just and
ecologically sustainable solutions to the climate and energy crises.
V. INTEGRATING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In addition to the strategies enumerated in Part IV, vindication of the
human right to food will require a holistic re-conceptualization of
international law that integrates human rights, environmental protection,
and trade and investment law rather than relegating them to separate
spheres. Such a vision must be premised on the hierarchical superiority of
human rights norms and must regard trade and investment as means
toward the realization of human rights and environmental objectives rather
than as ends in themselves. 98 This integrated vision of international law
must be explicitly incorporated into trade agreements rather than raised
defensively for the first time before dispute resolution tribunals. This
Comment concludes with a few suggestions to achieve this objective.
First, trade and investment agreements should explicitly provide that
human rights and environmental norms shall take priority in the event of a
conflict with the terms of trade and investment agreements. 99 Such an
approach is not unprecedented. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), for example, contains a conflict of norms provision
that gives hierarchical superiority to certain enumerated environmental
treaties in the event of a conflict with NAFTA provisions.100
Second, trade and investment agreements should contain broad human
rights and environmental exceptions designed to give the contracting
parties maximum flexibility to regulate in the public interest. Such
exceptions are widely used in the area of trade and investment law and
include, among others, the exceptions contained in GATT Article XX.101
Third, countries should require ex ante human rights and
environmental impact assessments of all trade and investment agreements
96. See id. at 9-13.
97. See Wahl, supra note 66 at 76-77 (recommending that trade in food on the spot or on
derivative markets be limited to registered traders and that highly speculative activities such
as short-selling be prohibited); INST. FOR AGRIC. TRADE POL'Y, COMMODITIES MARKET
SPECULATION: THE RISK TO FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE 10-11 (2008) (proposing national
and global regulatory strategies to address agricultural commodity market speculation),
available at http://www.iatp.org/iatp/publications.cfm?accountlD=451&reflD=104414.
98. See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 83, at 284-88; Gonzalez, supra note 92,
at 626-28; De Schutter, supra note 83, at 15-16.
99. See Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 626-28.
100. See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 104, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
101. See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 83, at 282-83.
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in order to identify and address any potential negative impacts. The
assessment should be performed as early as possible in the negotiation
process and should involve extensive public participation and
consultation. The assessment should disaggregate the impact according to
gender, race, ethnic origin, geographic region, and other variables so as to
better evaluate the distribution of gains and losses from the trade and
investment agreement.102 In the United States, for example, Executive
Order 13,141, issued in 1999, requires environmental review of trade
agreements.1 03 However, Executive Order 13,141 is deficient in several
respects, including failure to require review of extraterritorial and human
rights impacts and failure to mandate the periodic review of trade
agreements already in place. Nevertheless, this Executive Order represents
a good starting point.
Fourth, trade and investment agreements should contain simplified
waiver procedures in the event that these agreements subsequently conflict
with human rights and environmental considerations. 1 04 Such waiver
provisions have been used under the WTO framework, most recently to
waive limitations imposed upon the least developed countries by the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) in cases of national medical emergencies.105
Fifth, trade and investment agreements should contain sunset clauses,
akin to Article 20 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.106 Such clauses
should require ex post evaluation of these agreements' human rights and
environmental impacts, and should mandate renegotiation of the trade and
investment agreements taking into account the results of the evaluation.107
Finally, multilateral and bilateral investment agreements should
specify the rights and obligations of the foreign investor, the host state, and
the home state. Human rights and sustainable development should be the
express overarching objective of these agreements.108 This approach could
be used to impose standards of conduct on transnational corporations, to
require the home country of the foreign investor to more closely monitor
and regulate the extraterritorial activities of its companies, and to expand
the rights of victims of environmental and human rights abuses. 109 Such
102. See De Schutter, supra note 83, at 23-24.
103. See Exec. Order No. 13,141, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,169 (Nov. 16, 1999).
104. See De Schutter, supra note 83, at 23.
105. Id.
106. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 54, art. 20.
107. See De Schutter, supra note 83, at 25.
108. See AARON COSBEY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE TO THE USE AND
POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 29-35 (2004), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment invest and-sd.pdf. The International Institute
for Sustainable Development has drafted a model investment agreement and produced an
accompanying handbook with numerous suggestions on ways to balance investor rights and
host country policy space. See International Institute for Sustainable Development Model
Agreement on Investment, IISD.ORG, http://www.iisd.org/investment/model (last visited Apr.
16, 2010); see also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, IISD MODEL
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2006), available
at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-modelint-handbook.pdf.
109. See COSBEY, supra note 108, at 29-35; HOWARD MANN, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
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agreements could serve as important elements of developing countries'
regulatory strategy with respect to the growing number of "land grabs" in
the Global South. In addition, developing countries should reject
"economic stabilization" clauses in investment contracts between the host
state and the foreign investor that insulate foreign investors from lost
profits associated with subsequent changes in the host state's laws (e.g.
laws that impose environmental standards or place limits on the export of
food).11o These clauses may impair the host state's ability to comply with
its human rights and environmental obligations or subject the country to
substantial penalties for fulfilling these obligations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The food crisis, the financial crisis, and the climate crisis have created
new challenges to the attainment of global food security. However, these
crises have at long last brought international attention to the plight of the
small-scale farmers who cultivate the majority of the world's crops and
who protect the world's diminishing reserves of biodiversity.
Understanding the underlying structural causes of food insecurity is
critical if we are to promote just and equitable long-term solutions rather
than relying on short-term technical, supply-side fixes to problems that are
rooted in poverty and inequality.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS, BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: KEY ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES 13-15 (2008), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/iia business human rights.pdf.
110. De Schutter, supra note 83, at 18-19; SMALLER & MANN, supra note 95, at 10.
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